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“[Thanks to statistics] public broadsheets will be to the social world what the sensory organs are 
to the organic world” 
(Lois de l’imitation). 
 
 
Numbers, numbers, numbers. Sociology has been obsessed by the goal of 
becoming a quantitative science. Yet it has never been able to reach this goal 
because of what it has defined as being quantifiable within the social domain. The 
work of Gabriel Tarde has been resurrected for many reasons.  One of them, to 
be sure, is an acknowledgement of the diminishing returns of “social 
explanations”. In my view, however, it would be wrong to limit Tarde’s 
contribution to the theme of the “end of the social”.i If he has become so 
interesting, if he is read with such great avidity today, it is also because he engaged 
sociology, and more generally the human sciences —history, geography, 
archaeology, social psychology and above all economics— with a different 
definition of what it is for a discipline to be quantitative. (He also had an alternative 
definition of what it is to be a science, but this is another subject). 
In the last century, the schism between those who deal with numbers and 
those who deal with qualities has never been bridged. This is a fair statement 
given that so many scholars have resigned themselves to being partitioned into 
those who follow the model of the “natural” sciences, and those who prefer the 
model of the “interpretive” or “hermeneutic” disciplines. All too often, fields have 
been divided between number crunching, devoid (its enemies claim) of any 
subtlety; and rich, thick, local descriptions, devoid (its enemies say) of any way to 
generalize from these observations. Many domains have abandoned the hope of 
proving any point by transforming quantities into qualities, and qualities into 
quantities. Many in history or anthropology, as well as in sociology or psychology 
have tried, but at every occasion, the difficulties of reconciling the two types of 
proof have been so great that it is impossible to transition smoothly from one to 
the other. Many have despaired, as a consequence, of ever being able to develop a 
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scientific social science; while others have claimed that this goal is no longer 
desirable, that the best that can be hoped for is to obtain some political or literary 
effects on readers. 
What is so refreshing in Tarde (more than a century later!) is that he never 
doubted for a minute that it was possible to have a scientific sociology —or rather, 
an “inter-psychology”, to use his term. And he espoused this position without ever 
believing that this should be done through a superficial imitation of the natural 
sciences.  
 
1) Social sciences are more quantitative than 
natural ones 
Tarde’s reasoning goes straight to the heart of the matter: the natural 
sciences grasp their object from far away, and, so to speak, in bulk. A physicist 
deals with trillions upon trillions of gas molecules, a biologist with billions of cells. 
It is therefore quite normal that they should rely on a rough outline of the 
“societies” of gas and cells to make their observations. (Remember that for Tarde 
“everything is a society”). Resemblance is what appeals to the natural scientist. 
Individual differences can be safely neglected. Although the very distinction 
between a law or structure and its individual components is acceptable in natural 
sciences, it cannot be used as a universal template to grasp all societies. The 
distinction is an artifact of distance, of where the observer is placed and of the 
number of entities they are considering at once. The gap between overall structure 
and underlying components is the symptom of a lack of information: the elements 
are too numerous, their exact whereabouts are unknown, there exist too many 
hiatus in their trajectories, and the ways in which they intermingle has not been 
grasped. It would therefore be very odd for what is originally a deficit of information 
to be turned into the universal goal of any scientific inquiry. In the face of such a 
striking gap, it would make much more sense to tackle this limitation and to try to 
get more detailed information, instead of glowing with the belief that one has 
reached the level of an exact science. 
Physicists and biologists may be forgiven for having so little information 
since for the most part, they continue to access their objects of study from a great 
distance. But those who deal with type of societies composed of many fewer 
elements, societies that can be observed from the inside, do not have this excuse. 
Consider sociologists who study human societies.  (After all, what are a handful of 
billions of fellow humans when compared to the number of animalcules teaming 
in a drop of water?) Given the immense privilege of having proximity to their 
objects of study, sociologists should not be (mis)led into imagining that there could 
be a strict distinction between structural features and individual or sub-individual 
components.ii If they are, they have been engaged in the rather silly task of 
becoming voluntarily estranged from the societies they are studying. It implies that 
they are attempting to grasp them in the same way that astronomers deal with 
stars or biologists with cells. And yet, if the latter must handle their subject matter 
from far away, it is not because it is especially “scientific” to do so. It is because 
they have no other way to reach their objects of investigation. 
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Paradoxically, those in sociology who try to ape the natural sciences have 
mistaken the latter’s constitutive lack of information for their principal virtue! Yet 
what is really scientific is to have enough information so as to not have to fall back 
upon the makeshift approximation of a structural law, distinct from what its 
individual components do. What is perfectly acceptable for “sociologists” of stars, 
atoms, cells and organisms, is inacceptable for the sociologists of the few billions of 
humans, or for the economists of a few millions of transactions.  For in the latter 
cases, we most certainly have, or we should at least strive to possess, the 
information needed to dissolve the illusion of the structure.  
This first point about replacing the idea of what a science should be is 
crucial to grasp the deeper reasons for the opposition between Tarde and 
Durkheim. The tension is not simply due to a difference of attitude, as though one 
was more inclined to follow the individual agents while the other became obsessed 
by the relationship of the actor to the overall society. To be sure, this opposition is 
present, as the encounter between Tarde and Durkheim reproduced in this 
volume, has made quite clear.iii Beyond this, however, the tension is a 
consequence of a completely different way of calibrating what should be expected 
from any science of any society. Durkheim deals only with human societies and 
borrows his ideal of science from natural scientists with whom he has little 
occasion to collaborate since, for him, human societies should remain radically 
different from biological and physical ones. Tarde’s position is the reverse; for him 
there exist only societies.  Human societies are but a particular subset of these 
societies because they exist in so few copies. But since human societies are 
accessible through their most intimate features, social scientists have no need to let 
natural scientists dictate what their epistemology should be.   
The paradox is that it is Durkheim who imitates the natural sciences while 
at the same time distancing his discipline most radically from theirs. Meanwhile, 
Tarde, because he does not distinguish the ideal of science by separate domains, 
takes the greatest liberty in moving away from the customary ways of the natural 
sciences for presenting their objects. The shibboleth that distinguishes their 
attitudes is not that one is “for society” while the other is “for the individual 
actor”. (This is what the Durkheimians have quite successfully claimed so as to 
bury Tarde into the individual psychology he always rejected.) The distinction is 
drawn by whether one accepts or does not accept that a structure can be 
qualitatively distinct from its components. In response to this test question, 
Durkheim answers “yes” for both kinds of societies. Tarde says “yes”, for natural 
societies (for there is no way to do otherwise), but “no” for human societies. For 
human societies, and for only human societies, we can do so much more. 
 
2) Bypassing the notion of structure 
In the tired old debate pitting a naturalistic versus an interpretative social 
science, a strange idea appears: that if we stick to the individual, the local, the 
situated, you will detect only qualities, while if we move towards the structural and 
towards the distant, we will begin to gather quantities. For Tarde the situation is 
almost exactly the opposite: the more we get into the intimacy of the individual, 
the more discrete quantities we’ll find; and if we move away from the individual 
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towards the aggregate we might begin to lose quantities, more and more, along the 
way because we lack the instruments to collect enough of their quantitative 
evaluations. And this is the second reason why a science of society is possible for 
Tarde: the very heart of social phenomena is quantifiable because individual 
monads are constantly evaluating one another in simultaneous attempts to expand 
and to stabilize their worlds.  The notion of expansion is coded for him in the 
word “desire”, and stabilization in the word “belief” (more on this below).iv Each 
monad strives to possess one another. 
Most social scientists remain limited to the study of qualities when they 
handle only one entity, and quantification begins, so to speak, once they have 
collected large numbers of those entities. To the contrary, for Tarde, 
quantification began with the individual and was very difficult to maintain when 
shifting to aggregates. Consider this passage: 
“But before we speak, think, or act as “they” speak, think, or act in our world, we 
begin by speaking, thinking, and acting as “he” or “she” does. And this “he” or 
“she” is always one of our own near acquaintances. Beneath the indefinite they, 
however carefully we search, we never find anything but a certain number of he’s and 
she’s which, as they have increased in number, have become mingled together and 
confused” p.25.  
He then added:  
“The impersonal, collective character is thus the product rather than the producer 
of the infinitely numerous individual characters; it is their composite photograph, and 
must not be taken for their mask.” (27-28).v  
The relationship of the element to the aggregate is not the same as that of an 
ingredient to a structure. A “composite photograph”vi is not more than its 
individual components; it is not a law of behavior to which they should submit, 
minus individual variations. An “impersonal collective character” does not produce a 
behavior; it is itself produced by a multiplicity of individual innovations. There is 
nothing more in the accumulation of traits than there is in the multiplicity of 
individual components; but there definitely a lot less since elements become 
“mingled together and confused”. Or rather, there is perhaps more in the “they” 
than in the “he” and “she”, but this is because one monad has succeeded in 
expressing and possessing the whole. vii So, if we jump too quickly to the idea that 
an altogether different type of entity has taken over the action, just what that 
supplement is will becomes obscured. It is readily apparent that confusion increases 
when moving from the “he” to the “they”, instead of decreasing as might be 
expected following an introductory class in the methodology of the social sciences: 
“Gather more examples; forget individual traits; see things from farther away; 
from above; in bulk not in detail; for goodness sake, put it into a frame”. 
According to Tarde, from those well meaning pieces of advice, only disorientation 
can ensue!  
Does this mean that we should always stick to the individual? No, but we 
should find ways to gather the individual “he” and “she” without losing out on the 
specific ways in which they are able to mingle, in a standard, in a code, in a 
bundle of customs, in a scientific discipline, in a technology —but never in some 
overarching society. The challenge is to try to obtain their aggregation without 
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either shifting our attention at any point to a whole, or changing modes of inquiry. 
Composite photography is a very crude and primitive way that confuses all the 
criminals into a single type. Let’s try to find a better, more sensible, and above all, 
more traceable way of doing social science. And it does exist: those who commit 
crimes imitate one another.  They have to learn from one another, modus operandi 
per modus operandi, crime per crime, trick by trick.viii And the same can be said of 
the Ministry of Justice or of the police.  By assembling file after file, case after case, 
identification after identification, they end up producing “types of criminal” out of 
which the science of criminology will emerge.ix Following the “imitative rays” will 
render the social traceable from beginning to end without limiting us to the 
individual, or forcing a leap up to the level of a structure.x  
Tarde is often presented as a man with one idea —imitation. It is true that 
he became famous following the publication of his book, The Laws of Imitation, in 
1890.xi Nevertheless, it is important to understand that imitation is not an 
obsession of his. Nor is his point a psychological argument about how humans 
imitate one another, as if Tarde had generalized from some observations to the 
rest of his social psychology.xii The situation was rather the opposite. He was 
searching for a route by which to bypass the ill-conceived notion of structure when 
he stumbled upon a plausible vocabulary, borrowed in part from medicine, and 
later from psychology.xiii Imitation, that is, literally, the “epidemiology of ideas”. 
With this notion, he could render the social sciences scientific enough by following 
individual traits, yet without them getting confused when they aggregated to form 
seemingly “impersonal” models and transcendent structures. The term 
“imitation” may be replaced by many others (for instance, monad, Actor-Network 
or entelechy), provided these have the equivalent role: of tracing the ways in 
which individual monads conspire with one another without ever producing a 
structure.xiv  
In opposition to the entire century of social theory that followed it, this often 
quoted passage summarizes what is at stake for sociology to be scientific:  
“But, no matter how intimate, how harmonious a social group is, never do we see 
emerging ex abrupto, in the midst of its astonished associates, a collective self, which 
would be real and not only metaphoric, a sort of marvelous result, of which the 
associates would be the mere conditions. To be sure, there is always an associate that 
represents and personifies the group in its entirety, or else a small number of associates 
(the ministers in a State) who, each under a particular aspect, individualize in 
themselves the group in its entirety. But this leader, or those leaders, are always also 
members of that group, born from their own fathers and mothers and not born 
collectively from their subjects or their constituency.’’ p. 68. Monadologie et 
sociologie.  
For Tarde, if we were to believe that the first duty of social science is to 
“reconcile the actor and the system” or to “solve the quandary of the individual 
versus society”, we would have to abandon all hope of ever being scientific.  This 
is tantamount to aping the natural sciences which are perfectly alright in getting 
by with discovering a structure and neglecting minor individual variations because 
they are much too far to observe whether or not a “collective self” emerges ex 
abrupto from “its astonished associates”. Fortunately, in the case of human sciences, 
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we know this emergence is different.  We can verify every day, alas, that “leaders” 
are “born from fathers and mothers” and not “collectively”. This forces us to 
discover the real conduits through which any group is able to emerge. For 
instance, we might search for how associates might “individualize in themselves 
the group in its entirety” through legal or political vehicles. Once we have ferreted 
out what makes this phase transition possible we will be able to see with clarity, 
the difference between “individualizing a group” and “being an individual in a 
collective structure”.xv Each case requires a completely different feel for the 
complex ecology of the situation.  
If this requirement strikes you as less demanding, less empirically exacting, 
less “scientific” than the search for a structure, then it means that you will have 
abandoned, in effect, the search for quantification, for the real quanta that lie at the 
heart of each monad. 
 
3) Tracing the social world anew 
There is a third reason why Tarde believed in the scientific program of the 
social sciences: he thought that we could invent the instrumentation for capturing 
the inner quantification of individual entities. This implies that the great quandary 
of “the actor and the system” is but a consequence of a very patchy statistical 
apparatus; or, to put it more bluntly, that you have the social theory of your 
statistics.  
Tarde, who is often derided for having been “literary” instead of “scientific” 
knew very well what he was talking about. The misunderstanding is always the 
same. We confuse quantitative social sciences with a historical way of doing 
statistics.xvi But those techniques have changed immensely over the years. Rather 
than trying to eliminate individual variations so that they don’t perturb the overall 
result, many other ways of handling them have been discovered. The situation of 
the natural sciences, where individual variations remain inaccessible to any direct 
inquiry, and are far too numerous to record, is in no way the same as for the social 
sciences. For human societies, there is no reason to limit quantification to only 
some of the ways of doing statistics.xvii  
This assessment of statistics is so close to the heart of Tarde's work that he 
actually moved from his position as a judge in the provincial town of Sarlat (which 
he had occupied since 1875 before moving to Paris in 1894), after proposing 
alternative ways of assembling, interpreting and publishing, criminal, civil and 
commercial statistics to the Minister of Justice. (By then Tarde was already well 
known as a criminologist.)xviii As he argued there is no reason to consider 
individual variations as deviations from a more stable law that statistics was charge 
with educing out of the morass of chaotic data. Individual variations are the only 
phenomenon worth looking at in societies for which there are comparatively few 
elements. We have (or should have) full access to the aggregated dynamic. What is 
called a “structural law” by some sociologists is simply the phenomenon of 
aggregation: the formatting and standardization of a great number of copies, 
stabilized by imitation and made available in a new form, such as a code, a 
dictionary, an institution, or a custom. According to Tarde, if it is wrong to 
consider individual variations as though they were deviations from a law, it is 
116 Tarde-Candea 7 
equally wrong to consider individual variations as the only rich phenomenon to be 
studied by opposition with (or distance from) statistical results. It is in the nature of 
the individual agent to imitate others. What we observe either in individual 
variations or in aggregates are just two detectable moments along a trajectory drawn 
by the observer who is following the fate of any given “imitative ray”. To follow 
those rays (or “actor-networks” if you feel more comfortable with some updated 
vocabulary) is to encounter, depending on the moment, individual innovations 
and then aggregates, followed afterwards by more individual innovations. It is the 
trajectory of what circulates that counts, not any of its provisional steps. 
The importance of trajectory is the most clear with intellectual arguments, a 
domain of great fascination to Tarde. It is in the study of scientific practice that 
one can see how useless it is to drown individual contributions into statistical 
means (scientists are so few and so far between that any “whole” is provisional).  
Nonetheless, it would be just as silly to deny that, from individually made 
arguments in specific journals and specific times, aggregates are not produced in 
the end, by consensus formation and paradigm entrenchments that deeply modify 
how an individuals finds their way in an argument. This result is in no way due to 
a structural law suddenly overwhelming the diversity of negligible individual 
positions (the ex abrupto we saw above). In each of the scientists’ laboratories, for 
each of the issue at hand, each individual converts to the consensus each for his or 
her peculiar reason. Later, they may once again re-differentiate themselves from 
any established dogma.  
Of course, the wonderful thing about science, contrary to criminology or 
fashion where the traces are much more elusive, is that there exists —thanks to 
footnotes, references and citations— an almost uninterrupted set of traces, that allows 
us to move from each individual innovation, up to the aggregate, and then back 
again to the individual resistance that can develop in response to a given 
paradigm. 
"When, during some universal exhibition, we realize retrospectively how means of 
transportation have appeared in succession, since the time of the sedan-chair and the 
chariot until the time of the suspension carriage, the locomotive, the automobile and the 
bicycle, we behave much like the naturalist in a museum who compares the long series 
of vertebrates along the course of geological times from the lancelet to man. And yet, 
there is this difference that in the first case we are able to date exactly the appearance 
of most links in the chain and determine very precisely the invention and inventor from 
which each specimen comes from, while in the second case we are restricted to mere 
conjectures about the way a species transformed itself into another” (Psychologie 
économique, volume 1, p. 12.) 
We can understand from this passage what was meant earlier in pointing to the 
distinction between structure and ingredient as being due to a deficiency of 
information. If the researcher is in possession of this information, this chain of 
invention, this “imitative ray”, then there is no reason why they can not follow the 
individual innovation as well as the aggregates, smoothly. If there is a map of a 
river catchment, there is no need to leap from the individual rivulets to the River, 
with a capital R. We will follow, one by one, each individual rivulet until they 
become a river —with a small r.  
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What is so striking in the sociology of science is even more evident with regard 
to the law. This might explain in part why such an original social theory finds its 
origins in the writings of a man who was a judge. For a practicing judge the 
difference between the slow process of Common Law is not that different from 
Code based law.  In both case, and this is a peculiarity of legal reasoning, the rule 
does not give you an easy access to the individual case.xix A “juge d’instruction” (a 
strange mixture between a prosecutor, a judge and a lawyer, typical to the French 
“inquisitorial” tradition) is well placed to see that any “general opinion” grows 
case by case to form a “whole” that is nevertheless never superior to the case-law 
and that a reversal of precedent can easily reverse (well not easily, that’s the whole 
point). For a judge, the Code (or the case law) is never seen as more than a 
reference, a summary, a memory, a “composite photograph”, a guide; it is not a 
structure from which one could deduce any individual motif or to which 
individual behavior should obey. The law sits side by side with a multiplicity of 
cases and precedents.  
Son of a judge and a judge himself for most of his active life, Tarde  could feel 
the gap between rules and individual behavior every day. It is tempting to find 
within that longstanding judiciary practice the root of his deep seated diffidence to 
any structural account.xx When Tarde heard the words “laws of society” in 
Spencer or even Durkheim, or “laws of nature” when reading natural scientists, 
he knew, first hand, that this was, at best a loose legal metaphor, and that it could 
never truly be the way that elements and aggregates would conspire together.xxi  
Although deeply fascinated by Darwin, Tarde avoided the temptation of social 
Darwinism (quite a feat at the end of the 19th century) and for the same reason. 
Just as there is no “collective self” in human society, it can not be expected to 
appear in any in animal or plant society. He could not believe for one minute that 
sociology could be “reduced” to biology since in both cases societies are made of 
the same stuff. Hence Tarde’s powerful appropriation of Darwin’s discovery that 
no clarification on the genealogy of, for instance, individual horses, could ever 
come from an appeal to any Idea of a Horse. Among “astonished associates”, 
evolutionary biologist will never see the emergence ex abrupto of this “marvelous 
result”: a “collective Horse” born “collectively” from no mare and no stallion! 
Tarde might be considered the only French Darwinian, the only one who saw that 
the problem of composing organisms was the same in human and biological 
assemblages. No overall scheme in one, no overall scheme in the other. And 
especially, no “law of the jungle”. 
A judge, an avid reader of Leibniz (witness his most daring article Monadologie et 
sociologie) and of Darwin, could not but be struck by the case by case, organism by 
organism nature of any genealogy. For him, in whichever domain —science, law, 
biology— any belief in a structure is nothing but the pre-scientific, pre-Darwinian 
infancy of the social sciences.  Structure is what is imagined to fill the gaps when 
there is a deficit of information as to the ways any entity inherits from its 
predecessors and successors.  
Tarde would not have been greatly surprised to learn that when we apply the 
same ideal of science to societies of apes, ants or cells, here too, we begin to shift 
from a gross, statistically produced structure, to a trajectory of individual 
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innovations. When primatologists learned how to recognize individual baboons, 
vervets or chimpanzees, they too had to abandon rough and ready notions of a 
“collective self”. They began to follow how each organism managed to engender a 
highly unstable aggregate that had to be constantly surveyed and reassembled 
through interactions (grooming, following, fighting, copulating, etc).xxii Tarde 
would have been even more thrilled when the discovery was made that the study 
of bacteria, marked so as to individualize them, produces different results from 
those obtained by studying them in bulk. What was lost in the idea of a law plus 
minor individual variation was the rather amazing differentiation between 
individual bacterial contributions to reproductive success.xxiii The scientist who 
was clever enough to succeed in inventing an instrument able to capture the 
contributions of each bacteria (the same has been done with ants), has produced a 
much more accurate picture of their aggregates.  
Here again the opposition is not between a holistic view of the societies 
(bacteria, ants, monkeys or humans) and an individualist ones.  It is between a first 
approximation through crude statistical records that loses most of the inner 
quantification of the organism, and a more refined one that has learned how to 
follow how each of those organisms inherits and transmits its own individual 
innovations. Change the instruments, and you will change the entire social theory 
that goes with them. The only thing to lose is the notion of a structure, distinct 
from its incarnations, this artifact that compensates for a deficit of information. 
 
4) A monad, not an atom 
The more we focus on the individual monad the more quantitative evaluation 
we will get.  As long as we have not grasped this point, which seems at first so 
counterintuitive, the main difficulty of Tarde’s idea of quantification will remain, 
despite radically improved instruments. This is especially true in economics, a 
science to which Tarde dedicated his last yearsxxiv in an attempt to render it more 
quantitative and more psychological: “The tendency to mathematize economic 
science and the tendency to psychologize it, far from being irreconcilable, should 
rather, in our view, lend each other mutual support.”xxv He would add: 
“No man, no people has ever failed to seek, as a prize for relentless efforts, a 
certain growth either of wealth, or glory, or truth, or power, or artistic perfection; nor 
has he failed to fight against the danger of a decrease of all of these assets. We all 
speak and write as though there existed a scale of these different orders of magnitude, 
on which we can place different peoples and different individuals higher or lower and 
make them rise or fall continuously. Everyone is thus implicitly and intimately 
convinced that all these things, and not only the first, are, in fact, real quantities. Not 
to recognize this truly quantitative – if not measurable de jure and de facto — aspect 
of power, of glory, of truth, of beauty, is thus to go against the constant of mankind 
and to set as the goal of universal effort a chimera.” (Psychologie économique 
Tome 1. p. 67). 
Here resides the fourth and final reason why Tarde’s sociology seems so 
original and so fresh for us today. A judgment of taste, an inflexion in the way we 
speak, a slight mutation in our habits, a preference between two goods, a decision 
116 Tarde-Candea 10 
taken on the spur of the moment, an idea flashing in the brain, the conclusion of a 
long series of inconclusive syllogisms, etc —what appears most qualitative is 
actually where the greatest numbers of calculations are being made among 
“desires” and “beliefs”. So, in principle, for Tarde, this is also the locus where we 
should be best able to quantify. Providing, that is, that we have the instruments to 
capture what he calls “logical duels”.xxvi  
The quantitative nature of all associations will seem bizarre if we mistakenly 
impute an idea of the individual element seen as an atom to Tarde. But the very 
idea of an individual as an atom is a consequence of the social theory he is fighting 
against. It is an outcome, as we just saw, of the statistical instruments that were 
available back then. In this traditional view, quantification starts when we have 
assembled enough individual atoms so that the outline of a structure begins to 
appear, first as a shadowy aggregate, then as a whole, and finally as a law dictating 
how to behave to the elements. The division between a qualitative and a 
quantitative social science is in essence the same as the division between individuals 
and society, tokens and type, actors and system. This is why no one has ever 
succeeded in “overcoming” the dichotomy between holistic and individualistic 
social theories. 
But for Tarde, the whole scene is entirely different. The reason why there is no 
need for an overarching society is because there is no individual to begin with, or 
at least no individual atoms. xxvii The individual element is a monad, that is, a 
representation, a reflection, or an interiorisation of a whole set of other elements 
borrowed from the world around it. If there is nothing especially structural in the 
“whole”, it is because of a vast crowd of elements already present in every single 
entity. This is where the word “network” —and even actor-network— captures 
what Tarde had to say much better than the word “individual”. Contrary to what 
is often said, there is not even a hint of “methodological individualism” in this 
argument. There is no psychologism, nor of course any temptation toward 
“rational choice”.  
Hesitation is the great focus of Tarde’s work. When any actor is found to be 
hesitating it is not because they are an atom taken in different fields of forces 
pressing on them from the outside. An actor hesitates as a monad which has 
already gathered within itself vast numbers of other elements to which it offers the 
stage for an indefinite number of logical duels to take place. In other words, if we 
are able to quantify an individual “one”, it is because this instance is already 
“many”. Behind every “he” and “she”, one could say, there are a vast numbers of 
other “hes” and “shes” to which they have been interrelated.xxviii When Tarde 
insists that we detect specific embranchments and bifurcations behind every 
innovation, he is not saying that we should celebrate individual genius. It is rather 
that geniuses are made of a vast crowd of neurons!  
“In a society no individual may act socially without the collaboration of a vast 
number of other individuals, most often ignored. The obscure workmen who, through 
the accumulation of small facts, have prepared the apparition of a grand scientific 
theory formulated by a Newton, a Cuvier, a Darwin, compose, if one may say so, the 
organism of which this genius is the soul; their obscure works are the cerebral 
vibrations of which this theory is the conscience. Conscience means cerebral glory, 
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so to speak, of the most influential and most powerful element of the brain. Left to 
itself, a monad is powerless. This is the most important fact, and it leads immediately 
to explain another one: the tendency of monads to aggregate. (...) If ego is 
nothing but a directing monad among myriads of monads commensally aggregated 
under the same skull, what reason do we have to think that they are inferior? Is a 
monarch necessarily more intelligent that his ministers and subjects?” 
(Monadologie et sociologie, p. 28) 
A monarch is to his people, what conscience is to the brain, what ego is to 
the neurons, what Darwin is to the thousands of naturalists through the obscure 
work on which he depends for his “glory”! Once again, the “one” piggy backs on 
top of the “many” but without composing a “they”. This is where Tarde’s 
originality resides: everything is individual and yet there is no individual in the 
etymological sense of that which can not be further divided. This loss is a paradox, 
but only for those who would begin by opposing the structure and the elements.  
Tarde derives his position from Leibniz’ solution: there are monads all the 
way down, and God is in charge of regulating the connections between all of them 
without any of them acting directly on any other. For Tarde, of course, there is no 
God; therefore no pre-established harmony, no transcendence of any sort. (Tarde 
is probably the most systematic atheist there has ever been since he rejects even 
the transcendence of a “collective self” emerging ex abrupto from its associates.)xxix 
If there are monads but no God, the only solution is to let monads penetrate one 
another freely. Tarde’s monads are a cross between Leibniz and Darwin: each 
monad has to get by in order to interpret or “reflect” (Leibniz’s term) all of the 
others, to spread as far and as quickly as possible.  
Tarde devises his notions of “desire”, “belief” and “possession” very early on 
to code those relationships of interpenetration and competition from which all 
quantification resides in the end. The question “how many” is as essential to a 
monarch representing his people without any already existing political structure to 
hold them, as it is to Darwin’s theory of evolution emerging out of the myriads of 
factoids assembled by his numerous collaborators toiling to collect samples in 
obscurity. How many entities can one entelechy reach? —That is desire. Mow 
many can they stabilize, order, fix or keep in place? —That is belief. No 
providence whatsoever can produce any harmony over and above the interplay of 
desire and belief in each monad, let loose on the world.xxx 
This is precisely the reason why quantification is so important: not only does 
it capture internal logical duels, but it is the only way for monads to coordinate their 
actions externally with others in the absence of any providence. In a very strict 
sense in Tarde’s atheist monadology the practice of quantification plays the role of Leibniz’ God. 
With extreme avidity (a term Tarde prefers to that of ‘identity’), all monads will 
seize every possible occasion to grasp one another in a quantitative manner. This 
accelerates and also simplifies their aggregation and cohesion; it modifies them 
and gives them another turn and another handle. It is in this sense that Tarde can 
be considered as the inventor of the notion that producing instruments and 
formalisms plays an active role in making the social visible to itself; and that such 
production offers many new handles so that the social can be performed anew.xxxi 
Examine what he says about how the advent of the press facilitates all judgments: 
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“[…] The development of the press had the effect of giving moral values a 
quantitative character that was more and more marked and better and better suited to 
justify their comparison with the exchange value. The latter, which must also have 
been quite confused in the centuries before the common use of currency, became better 
defined as currency spread and became more unified. It was then able to give rise, for 
the first time, to political economy. Similarly, before the advent of the daily press, the 
notions of the scientific or literary value of writing, of people’s fame and reputation, 
were still vague, as the awareness of their gradual waxings and wanings could barely 
be felt; but with the development of the press, these ideas became clearer, were 
accentuated, became worthy of being the objects of philosophical speculations of a new 
sort.” (Psychologie économique-1, p. 76).  
When Tarde says there is no “whole” transcendent to its instantiations, and 
when he says that any quantification deployed by various statistical or 
metrological instruments will have huge influence on the way all monads cohere 
and conspire, he is repeating the same argument twice. This is why his theory of 
science is so original: science is in and of the world it studies. It does not hang over 
the world from the outside. It has no privilege. This is precisely what makes 
science so immensely important: it performs the social together with all of the 
other actors, all of whom try to turn new instruments to their own benefits.  
The continuity between the inner and the outer quantification is so 
complete that Tarde goes even further.  He assimilates the quantitative apparatus 
of so many social sciences to the biological senses. He imagines a progressive 
fusion between the technologies of statistical instruments and the very physiology 
of perception. A day will come, he argues, when the standardization and 
development of statistics will be so complete that we will begin to follow the 
trajectory of some data about the social world in the same way as we follow the 
flight of a swallow with out eyes.xxxii Does this strike you as poetry? History is not 
yet finished, so we must wait and see. A century from now we may well read those 
predictions in a very different light: data gathering instrumentations will have 
changed again, and so will the social theories associated with them. 
 
5) Digital traceability… Tarde’s vindication? 
The amazing chapter devoted to statistics in The Laws of Imitation is inescapably 
connected to the digital world to which we now have access.  
“If Statistics continues to progress as it has done for several years, if the information 
which it gives us continues to gain in accuracy, in dispatch, in bulk, and in regularity, 
a time may come when upon the accomplishment of every social event a figure will at 
once issue forth automatically, so to speak, to take its place on the statistical registers 
that will be continuously communicated to the public and spread abroad pictorially by 
the daily press. Then, at every step, at every glance cast upon poster or newspaper, we 
shall be assailed, as it were, with statistical facts, with precise and condensed 
knowledge of all the peculiarities of actual social conditions, of commercial gains or 
losses, of the rise or falling off of certain political parties, of the progress or decay of a 
certain doctrine, etc., in exactly the same way as we are assailed when we open our 
eyes by the vibrations of the ether which tell us of the approach or withdrawal of such 
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and such a so-called body and of many other things of a similar nature’’ (The Laws 
of Imitation, p. 167-168).  
Is this the prose of someone who despises quantitative science? If it true, as 
Tarde never tired of objecting to his younger colleague, Durkheim, that the theory 
of “society” was an artifact of rudimentary statistics, then the consequence for the 
present are obvious: what would happen to the respective programs of Tarde and 
Durkheim if social scientists began to have access, a century later, for reasons 
totally unexpected to both, to types of data that would allow them to follow, 
without any interruption, with the same tools, and in the same optically coherent 
space, those “imitative rays” that encompass individual innovations as well their 
aggregates? It is on this point that we discover why Tarde appears so fresh. The 
interest he triggers is not about a curious failure of social theory to become 
scientific, a quaint and queer qualitative view of the social. The most interesting 
part of Tarde is his lucid expectation of the type of information that should be 
gathered for a science of the social.  
It is indeed striking that at this very moment, the fast expanding fields of “data 
visualization”, “computational social science” or “biological networks”xxxiii are 
tracing, before our eyes, just the sort of data Tarde would have acclaimed. If the 
sociology of science, because of the traceability inherent in the scientific 
references, would have been the model for disentangling the “hes” and “shes” 
from the “they” for Tarde, then what we are witnessing, thanks to the digital 
medium, is a fabulous extension of this principle of traceability.  It has been put in 
motion for not only to scientific statements, but also for opinions, rumors, political 
disputes, individual acts of buying and bidding, social affiliations, movements in 
space, telephone calls, and so on. What has previously been possible for only 
scientific activity —that we could have our cake (the aggregates) and eat it too (the 
individual contributors)— is now possible for most events leaving digital traces, 
archived in digital databanks, thanks, let’s say, to Google and associates.  
It is quite amusing to imagine Tarde directing his statistical bureau, nurturing 
so many doubts about the quality of the data he was handing out to the Ministry 
of Justice (and also to Marcel Mauss who was helping his uncle to write his book, 
Suicide, in which Tarde was trashed every two footnotes…), while dreaming, at the 
same time, of the many interesting quantitative instruments he had no way of 
obtaining: the “gloriometer” for following reputation (so easily accessible now with 
page rankings); conversation for understanding economic transactions (now the 
object of so many tools following buzz and viral marketing);xxxiv “phonometers” 
like those invented by Abbé Rousselotxxxv in order to follow the smallest inflexions 
of the native speakers (now accessible through the automated study of vast corpus 
of documents).  
When Tarde claimed that statistics would one day be as easy to read as 
newspapers, he could not have anticipated that the newspapers themselves would 
be so transformed by digitalization that they would merge into the new domain of 
data visualization. This is a clear case of a social scientist being one century ahead 
of his time because he had anticipated a quality of connection and traceability 
necessary for good statistics which was totally unavailable in 1900. A century later, 
networks and traces are triggering the excitement of social and natural scientists 
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everywhere.xxxvi Here again, we note that the same scholars no longer make any 
distinction between the natural and the social domains to which they apply the 
same notion of networks: “Everything is a society”, including ants, bacteria, cells, 
scientific paradigms or markets. 
What Tarde could not have anticipated, however, are the added bonuses of the 
digital world that now provides an embodiment for his theory, at last: the notion 
of navigation where we are able to physically (well, virtually) navigate on our screens 
from the individual data points to the aggregates and back. In other words, the 
aggregate has lost the privilege it maintained for one century. Through the ease 
with which we can navigate a datascape, we manage to interrupt the 
transubstantiation of the aggregate into a law, a structure, a model and complicate 
the way through which one monad may come to summarize the “whole”. But he 
“whole” is now nothing more than a provisional visualization which can be 
modified and reversed at will, by moving back to the individual components, and 
then looking for yet other tools to regroup the same elements into alternative 
assemblages.xxxvii  
To be sure, the many tools we now have on our screens are still primitive (and 
many network based images are often no more readable than tea leaves at the 
bottom of a cup). But that’s not the essential point. The point is that the whole has 
lost its privileged status: we can produce out of the same data points, as many 
aggregates as we see fit, while reverting back at any time, to the individual 
components.xxxviii This is precisely the sort of movement that was anticipated by 
Tarde’s social theory although he had no tool to explicate his vision, other than 
his prose. While he was attempting to direct attention towards the “imitative ray” 
in and of itself, in order to displace the individual element as well as the structural 
whole, it has been altogether too easy for sociologists, starting with Durkheim, to 
corner him into dead end discussions about the micro versus the macro, the 
psychological versus the sociological, or the individualistic versus the holistic. In an 
unfair twist, it has been those who had only rudimentary tools, who have 
appeared more scientific than the one who was envisioning a much more refined 
and accurate type of data. Digital navigation through point-to-point datascapes 
might, a century later, vindicate Tarde’s insights.  
The overarching advantage of this type of quantification is worth underscoring: 
because “everything is a society” there is no clear divide between the biological 
and the social. For the first time in the history of science, the same data may look 
just as familiar to those who come from the “natural” sciences as to those who 
come from the “interpretative” ones. At the very least, reading Tarde might help 
social scientists to seize upon the opportunity provided by new digital media much 
faster than they might otherwise have done. The insights in his work can assist us 
in abandoning the impossible task of reconciling an old social theory, born out of 
discontinuous data, with the research terrain we now have readily available, at a 
click of a mouse. 
                                                
* This paper has been written with the support of the European Program 
MACOSPOL (www.macospol.com). I thank Dominique Boullier, 
Emmanuel Didier, Louise Salmon & especially Isabelle Stengers for their 
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116 Tarde-Candea 15 
                                                                                                                                 
i Latour, Bruno (2002) "Gabriel Tarde and the End of the Social", In The 
Social in Question. New Bearings in the History and the Social 
Sciences, (Eds, Joyce, P.) London, Routledge, pp. 117-132 ; Toews, David 
(2003) "The New Tarde: Sociology after the End of the Social", Theory, 
Culture and Society, 20, 81-98. 
ii It is the very definition of the individual being that is in question for Tarde, see 
below. 
iii Chapter one: “The Debate Tarde/Durkheim”, pp.xx 
iv See the excellent point made in Montebello, Pierre (2003) L'autre 
métaphysique. Essai sur Ravaisson, Tarde, Nietzsche et 
Bergson, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, on those two difficult and central 
notions of Tarde, especially pp. 122-127. 
v Monadologie et Sociologie translation Terry N. Clarke (1969) Gabriel 
Tarde. On Communication and Social Influence. Selected 
Papers. Edited by Terry N. Clark, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press. 
vi This was a great attraction at the turn of the century, especially when it was 
used to visualize the “criminal type” by superimposing images of criminals 
in the police archives! Gamboni, Dario (2005) « Composing the Body 
Politic. Composite Images and Political Representations 1651-2004 », In 
Making Things Public. The Atmospheres of Democracy, (Eds, 
Latour, B. and P. Weibel) Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press. 
vii On the key concept of possession, see Debaise, Didier (2008) "Une 
métaphysique des possessions. Puissances et sociétés chez Gabriel Tarde", 
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 60, 8, 447-460. 
viii : “Il en résulte que la contagion imitative de cette corporation antisociale 
[les brigands] ne reste pas tout entière renfermée dans son propre sein, 
où elle se traduit par le mutuel endurcissement, mais qu'elle rayonne en 
partie au dehors parmi les déclassés qu'elle classe, parmi les oisifs qu'elle 
occupe, parmi les décavés de tout genre qu'elle enfièvre des perspectives 
d'un nouveau jeu, le plus riche en émotions. Voilà la vraie source du 
mal.” (Criminalité comparée, p. 52) cité in Didier Emmanuel 
“Tarde et le mouvement statistique” (document de travail, CESDIP, 
juin 2007). 
ix For Tarde, the production of data by the administrations and the institutions 
is always foregrounded which makes him, once again, an important 
precursor of science studies. For him, the sciences –natural, social or 
cameral— are added to the world they study. This is especially true in the 
case of criminology, Tarde, Gabriel (2004) La Criminalité comparée, 
Paris, Les Empêcheurs. In the case of criminal records, he had a first hand 
knowledge of the ways they work (see below).  
x In Laws of imitation Tarde claims that the best way to detect those 
imitative rays is in archeology since only there -when the living beings have 
disappeared and you are left with long series of artifacts- do you see in the 
purest and most abstract light what has been imitated by the long 
disappeared humans. 
xi Tarde, Gabriel (1962) The laws of imitation. Translated from the 2d 
French ed. by Elsie Clews Parsons. With an introd. by Franklin H. 
Giddings., Gloucester, Mass, P. Smith. 
116 Tarde-Candea 16 
                                                                                                                                 
xii This is the critique made by Sperber, Dan (1996) La contagion des idées, 
Paris, Editions Odile Jacob. No doubt that Tarde would have been 
fascinated nonetheless by the discovery of mirror neurons, Rizzolatti, 
Giacomo, Sinigaglia Corrado and Raiola Marilène (2008) Les neurones 
miroirs, Paris, Odile Jacob.. 
xiii Tarde does for social theory what Pasteur had done in epidemiology: in the 
same way as bacteriology allows one to move from a regional theory of 
miasmas to a point to point and person to person theory of contagion 
through a specific vector (cholera bacillus, Koch' bacillus, etc), Tarde 
moves from an aggregated cloud of collective qualities to a highly specific 
point to point, person to person "contagion" of ideas each of them having 
its own peculiar effectivity. 
xiv This is what allowed me to consider Tarde as the real inventor of ANT 
Latour, Bruno (2005) Reassembling the Social. An Introduction to 
Actor-Network Theory, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
xv What makes a society in Tarde has been the special concern of Debaise, op. 
cit.  
xvi I am following here Didier, Emmanuel “Tarde et le mouvement statistique” 
(document de travail, CESDIP, juin 2007) and (2009) En quoi 
consiste l'Amérique? Les statistiques, le New Deal et la 
démocratie, Paris, La Découverte. 
xvii For a broad view of the many different ways social sciences have developed 
to grasp the collective, see Desrosières, Alain (2002) The Politics of 
Large Numbers: A History of Statistical Reasoning (translated 
by Camille Naish), Cambridge, Mass, Cambridge University Press. 
xviii A “Mémoire sur l’organisation de la statistique criminelle en France”, 1893. 
Most of his work is now available in Tarde, Gabriel (2004) La 
Criminalité comparée, Paris, Les Empêcheurs. 
xix Latour, Bruno (2009) Law in the Making. An Ethnography of the 
Conseil d'Etat (translated by Marina Brilman and Alain Pottage), 
London, Polity Press.. 
xx See the same argument in Milet, Jean, “Introduction”, in Tarde Gabriel, Les 
Transformations du droit, Paris, Berg International, 1994, pp. 7-9. I thank 
Louise Salmon for this reference. Her thesis on the history of Tarde’s 
milieu will contain many important material on this link between the 
practice of law and Tarde’s social theory. 
xxi He even extended this diffidence to the laws of nature : “materialists have to 
invoke, as complement of their erratic and blinds atoms, universal laws or 
the unique formula to which all those laws could be reduced, a sort of 
mystical commandment to whom all beings would obey and which would 
emanate from no being whatsoever, sort of ineffable and unintelligible verb 
which, without having ever been uttered by anyone, would nonetheless be 
listened to always and everywhere.’’ p. 56 Monadologie et sociologie. 
xxii Strum, Shirley and Fedigan Linda (Eds.), (2000) Primate Encounters, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press ; Cheney, Dorothy L. and Seyfarth 
Robert M. (1990) How Monkeys See the World. Inside the Mind of 
Another Species, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
116 Tarde-Candea 17 
                                                                                                                                 
xxiii Stewart, Eric J., Madden Richard, Paul Gregory and Taddei François (2004) 
"Aging and Death in an Organism That Reproduces by Morphologically 
Symmetric Division", PLoS Biol, 3, doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0030045. 
xxiv But on which he had already contributed in one of its earliest articles “La 
psychologie ou économie politique”, Revue Philosophique, tome xii, 
1881, pp. 232-250; 401-418. 
xxv Psychologie économique is published in 1904 ; see Latour, Bruno and 
Lépinay Vincent (2008) L'économie science des intérêts passionnés 
- introduction à l'anthropologie économique de Gabriel Tarde, 
Paris, La Découverte, (English translation: (2009) The Science of 
Passionate Interests. An Introduction to Gabriel Tarde's Economic 
Anthropology, Prickly Paradigm Press, Chicago (2009), most of the important 
passages are accessible on the following site : http://www.bruno-
latour.fr/). See also the special issue on Tarde’s economics: Economy and 
Society, Volume36, Number4, November2007. 
xxvi See Tarde, Gabriel (1999) La logique sociale, Paris, Les Empêcheurs de 
penser en rond which is entirely devoted to an alternative quantitative and 
yet non formalist socio-logic. 
xxvii The same argument is made by the pragmatists, see Dewey, John (1927 
1954) The Public and Its Problems, Athens, Ohio University Press, 
especially the second chapter which deduces the very notion of an 
“individual” from a faulty definition of the State. It is interesting to note 
that the domination of the notion of structure on social thought is so strong 
that Tarde, as well as the pragmatists, have been constantly misunderstood. 
xxviii Hence Tarde’s interest in the phenomenon that economists of innovation 
and historians of technology call “lock in”, “standardization” or 
“entrenchment”. 
xxix Witness the radical critique of providentialism Tarde pursues throughout the 
whole of Psychologie économique. This critique allows him to criticize 
the notion of a social animal as well as that of the laissez-faire free 
marketers… Latour and Lépinay op. cit. p.xx.  
xxx Tarde's first paper on the question from 1880 has a very revealing title: “La 
croyance et le désir, la possibilité de leur mesure”, Revue philosophique, 
tome X, pp. 150-180, 264-283, republished in Essais et mélanges 
sociologiques, Maloine 1895.  “No intellectual effort will make it possible 
to conceive of an animal, or a monocellular organism, which, being 
sensitive, would not also be endowed with belief and desire, that is, will not 
associate and dissociate, collect and reject its impressions, its sensations 
whatever they are, with more or less intensity. M. Delboeuf explains very 
well that even an infusoria is able to utter this mute judgment: I am hot”. 
Essais et Mélanges, p. 185 candad 
xxxi Even though the word “performative” is hotly debated (see Emmanuel 
Didier “Do Statistics “perform” the Economy?” in MacKenzie, Donald, 
Muniesa Fabian and Siu Lucia (Ed.), (2007) Do Economists Make 
Markets? On the Performativity of Economics, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press) it is still the best concept to define science 
studies’ interpretation of the reflexive nature of formalisms.  
xxxii Pages 75-132 in Tarde, Gabriel (1903) The Laws of Imitation (translated 
by Else Clews Parsons with an introduction by Franlin H. Giddings), New 
York, Henry Holt and Company. 
116 Tarde-Candea 18 
                                                                                                                                 
xxxiii Lazer, David and alii (2009) "Computational Social Science", Science, 323, 
721-723; Wimsatt, William C. (2007) Re-Engineering Philosophy for 
Limited Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality, 
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press. 
xxxiv Emanuel Rosen (2009) The Anatomy of Buzz Revisited: Real-life 
lessons in Word-of-Mouth Marketing, Broadway Business. 
xxxv See Andy Barry’s chapter in this volume. 
xxxvi Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo (2003) Linked: How Everything Is Connected 
to Everything Else and What It Means, Plume, New York ; Benkler, 
Yochai (2006) The Wealth of Networks. How Social Production 
Transforms Market and Freedom, New Haven, Yale University 
Press. 
xxxvii For striking examples of such a navigation, see 
http://www.demoscience.org/ assembled by the European project 
MACOSPOL. 
xxxviii Mogoutov, Andrei, Cambrosio Alberto and Mustar Philippe (2008) 
"Biomedical innovation at the laboratory, clinical and commercial 
interface: A new method for mapping research projects, publications and 
patents in the field of microarrays," Journal of Informetrics, 2, 341-353. 
